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Abstract What determines the reference of first-person thoughts—thoughts that
one would express using the first-person pronoun? I defend a model on which our
ways of gaining knowledge of ourselves do, in much the way that our ways of
gaining knowledge of objects in the world determine the reference of perceptual
demonstrative thoughts. This model—the Demonstrative Model of First-Person
Thought—can be motivated by reference to independently plausible general prin-
ciples about how reference is determined. But it faces a serious objection. There
seems to be an explanatory rival to it with a great deal of plausiblility. The rival is
The Simple Rule Model, which says that first-person thoughts are governed by the
simple rule that any token of one will be about the person whose token it is. I
pinpoint a crucial unclarity in The Simple Rule Model, hinging on how we
understand the notion of a rule, and argue that no version of the Simple Rule Model
is both plausible and a genuine explanatory rival to the Demonstrative Model. I also
provide an argument that the Demonstrative Model is extensionally adequate.
Keywords First-person thought  Token-reflexive rule  Knowledge-maximization 
Introspection  Quasi-proprioception
Suppose I think ‘‘I am hungry’’—i.e. I think a thought that I would express by
uttering that sentence. The object of that thought will be myself. Why is that? What
determines the reference of our first-person thoughts—the thoughts that we express
using sentences that contain the first-person? On the view defended here, our ways
of gaining knowledge of ourselves do. We have a multitude of very rich ways of
gaining knowledge of ourselves—e.g. proprioception, kinaesthesia, introspection.
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The view defended is that these ways of gaining knowledge are what enable us to
latch onto ourselves in first-person thought.
An analogous view about the mechanisms for reference-determination is highly
plausible for some other kinds of thought. Suppose I am looking directly at a bottle
placed before me on a table. I think ‘‘That bottle is small’’. We may stipulate that I
do not possess any name that refers to the bottle, and do not use any descriptions it
uniquely satisfies to single it out. Nevertheless, I can in fact single the bottle out.
Intuitively, that is because vision—a very rich way of gaining knowledge of objects
in one’s environment—enables me to latch onto the bottle in thought. On the view
about first-person thought defended here, it is similarly the case that when I think a
first-person thought, my various ways of gaining knowledge of the object my
thought is about—myself—are what enable me to latch onto that object in thought.
Just so as to have a label, I shall refer to the view I defend about how the
reference of first-person thoughts is determined as The Demonstrative Model. The
label is natural since the view implies that the story about how the reference of first-
person thoughts is determined is parallel to the most natural story to tell about how
the reference of at least one kind of thought that can be expressed using a
demonstrative expression—our example is a visual demonstrative thought—is
determined. But it is no part of what The Demonstrative Model claims that ‘‘I’’ is
really a demonstrative expression (perhaps meaning the same as ‘‘this body’’ or
‘‘this mind’’), or that first-person thoughts are really a kind of demonstrative
thought. No assimilation of one kind of thought to a different kind of thought is
intended. Relatedly, it would not matter for my purposes if it somehow turned out
that, actually, the right story to tell about how the reference of thoughts like my
‘‘That bottle is small’’ thought is determined does not mention vision. My focus here
is just on the question of how the reference of first-person thoughts is determined.
The comparison between first-person thoughts, as I think we should conceive of
them, and certain demonstrative thoughts, as it highly natural to conceive of these, is
purely an expository device.
In Sect. 1, I provide some initial motivation for my account. The Demonstrative
Model addresses a question about how the reference of a particular kind of thought
is determined. To answer this kind of question we need to appeal to some general
principle about how thoughts’ reference is determined. A variety of such principles
have been proposed. I argue that any of the most plausible candidate principles can
be used to make a prima facie case for The Demonstrative Model. That means that
the defence of The Demonstrative Model need not rest on the details of how
delicate, and highly general, issues about reference-determination are resolved.
In Sect. 2, I address the objection that that there is an alternative, much less
contentious model available of what determines the reference of first-person
thoughts. This alternative model—The Simple Rule Model—says that first-person
thought are governed by the simple rule that any token of one will be about the
person whose token it is, i.e. the person who produces the token. If The
Demonstrative Model is inconsistent with The Simple Rule Model, the argument
goes, then The Demonstrative Model should be rejected. But if The Demonstrative
Model is consistent with The Simple Rule Model, then it is redundant. So The
Demonstrative Model is at best redundant. The Simple Rule Model occupies such a
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hegemonic place in the literature on first-person thought that this kind of argument
can seem like a devastating objection to The Demonstrative Model.1
My response to it is to pinpoint a crucial unclarity in The Simple Rule Model. We
can distinguish a robust and a non robust way of understanding what the model says,
corresponding to a robust and non robust way of understanding the notion of a rule
that it invokes. On the robust notion of a rule, what the model says is not plausible.
On the non-robust notion of a rule, what the model says is plausible. But it fails to
address the explanatory question addressed by The Demonstrative Model. So it turns
out that there is no version of The Simple Rule Model that is both plausible and
explanatory. One large block to accepting The Demonstrative Model is thus
dislodged.
In Sect. 3, I address the question of whether The Demonstrative Model is
extensionally adequate, focusing on two kinds of influential problem case in which
The Demonstrative Model appears to conflict with the claim that any token first-
person thought will be about the person whose token it is.2 One response to such
cases is to deny that the claim that any token first-person thought will be about the
person whose token it is constitutes an extensional adequacy constraint on an
account of first-person thought. The most influential defender of The Demonstrative
Model, Gareth Evans, pursued this response. He insisted that it was possible, in
empirically remote but metaphysically possible circumstances, for first-person
thought tokens to fail to refer to anything at all.3
In my view, this is the wrong response. The Demonstrative Model will only be
believable if it can give a treatment of the problem cases that enables us to respect
the constraint that any token first-person thought will be about the person whose
token it is. I show that giving such a treatment is possible. In giving so, it is
necessary to accept, pace Evans, that introspection—which we can think of,
minimalistically, as our direct way of gaining knowledge of our mental properties—
can play exactly the same kind of role in fixing the reference of first-person thoughts
as, for example, proprioception and kinaesthesia do. In appealing to introspection,
we crucially—and, I argue, legitimately—expand The Demonstrative Model’s set of
resources for dealing with problem cases. With the expanded set of resources in
place, The Demonstrative Model is seen to have more plausibility than Evans’s
pioneering defense of it did.
I think a fair, if slightly startling, summary of the attitude amongst contemporary
theorists of the first-person to The Demonstrative Model is that it is a perennially
attractive position for which a decisive refutation exists—so, a siren-song position. In
my view, the felt attractiveness of the position is an expression of dissatisfaction with
The Simple Rule Model alternative. Section 2 articulates a justification for this
1 The argument is central in Campbell (1994). The idea that first-person thoughts are governed by a
simple rule is also prominent in O’Brien (2007) and Peacocke (2008). It is the transposition to the domain
of thought of the Kaplanian orthodoxy according to which the first-person in language is governed by the
rule that any utterance of it will refer to the utterer. Nothing I say in this paper is incompatible with this
being the right thing to say about the first-person in language.
2 The problem cases are discussed in Campbell (1994), and developed further in O’Brien (2007).
3 For Evans’s defense of The Demonstrative Model see Evans (1982, pp. 205–266).
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dissatisfaction by explaining why there is no version of The Simple Rule Model that is
both plausible and explanatory. The supposedly decisive refutation of The Demon-
strative Model is that it cannot respect the extensional adequacy constraint that any
token first-person thought will be about the person whose token it is. Section 3 shows
that this supposedly decisive refutation depends on underestimating The Demonstra-
tive Model’s resources for dealing with problem cases. Sections 2 and 3 thus jointly
constitute a pincer-movement which, if successful, tips the balance decisively against
The Simple Rule Model and in favor of The Demonstrative Model.
1 Reference-determination principles and The Demonstrative Model
Suppose that a subject is looking at a bottle on a table and this leads them to think
‘‘That bottle is small’’. Why is the subject’s thought about just that bottle and no
other? ‘‘Because that bottle is the bottle the subject is looking at’’ may be a perfectly
good answer to this question. But there is a natural follow up question. Why is the
thought about the bottle the subject is looking at? What general principle about how
thoughts’ reference is determined is there that illuminates why the fact that a
particular bottle is the thing being looked at can contribute to making it, in addition,
the thing being thought about?
Giving satisfying answers to such reference-determination questions has proven
difficult. There is a surfeit of candidate answers each of which has some plausibility.
Perhaps there is some general acquaintance constraint on reference, and the reason the
subject’s thought is about the bottle is that looking at the bottle is a way of being
acquainted with it.4 Perhaps there is a general constraint on reference according to
which reference tends tomaximize knowledge, and looking at the bottle contributes to
making it the thing thought about because looking at something is a way of gaining
knowledge of that thing. Perhaps there is a general constraint on reference according to
which reference tends to maximize justification, internalistically construed, and
looking at the bottle contributes tomaking it the thing thought about because looking at
something is away of gaining justification, internalistically construed, of that thing.5 It
is not easy to adjudicate between these principles. Many of the examples one might
give to motivate one’s favorite generalization about how reference is determined in
fact fall just short, failing to providemore support for one’s favorite principle than they
do for nearby rivals. On the other hand, it is unappealing to reject reference-
determination questions about thoughts as unanswerable. That would be to accept that
it is just a brute fact that certain thoughts have the reference they have, and that there is
nothing further to be said about what makes this the case.
Fortunately, from the point of The Demonstrative Model many of the
controversies about how reference-determination questions are answered do not
4 This is the kind of principle Evans accepts, and uses to motivate The Demonstrative Model. For
criticism of acquaintance requirements, see Manley and Hawthorne (2012).
5 For a defense of the knowledge-maximization principle see Williamson (2007). Williamson also
discusses and criticizes the internalist justification-maximization principle. For discussion and criticism of
Williamson on knowledge-maximization see McGlynn (2012) and Martin (2009).
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matter. For any one of the principles described in the previous paragraph may be
used to make a prima facie case for The Demonstrative Model.
Suppose the reason that looking at a bottle enables reference to it in thought is that
looking at something is a way of being acquainted with it. That raises the question of
why looking at something counts as a way of being acquainted with it. Presumably the
answer is that it does because vision is a rich and direct epistemic relationship. If so,
then proprioception should also count as away of being acquainted aswell. For it too is
an extremely rich and direct epistemic relationship. But if proprioception is a way of
being acquainted with something, then it seems eminently suited to being a
relationship in virtue of which one satisfies the acquaintance requirement when one
thinks about oneself using a first-person thought like ‘‘I have crossed knees’’. After all,
first-person thoughts are always about oneself and, at least at first glance, the only
person one ever has proprioceptive awareness of is oneself. Exactly the same case
could bemade for introspection’s being away of being acquaintedwith oneself. It may
be in the end that The Demonstrative Model must be rejected. But, if the principle of
acquaintance is correct, there is a prima facie case for it.
Suppose instead that the reason that looking at a bottle enables reference to it in
thought is that a knowledge-maximization principle is correct and looking at
something is a way of gaining knowledge of that thing. On this supposition, being a
source of knowledge is precisely what qualifies vision to fix the reference of visual
demonstrative thoughts’ reference. But proprioception and introspection have
precisely the same qualification to fix the reference of first-person thoughts—they
too are sources of knowledge. And if proprioception and introspection are what fix
the reference of first-person thoughts, that means that The Demonstrative Model is
correct. It may be in the end that The Demonstrative Model must be rejected. But if
the knowledge-maximization principle is correct, there is a prima facie case for it.
Suppose instead that the reason that looking at a bottle enables reference to it in
thought is that a justification-maximization principle is correct and looking at
something is a way of gaining justification of that thing. On this supposition, being a
source of justification is precisely what qualifies vision to fix the reference of visual
demonstrative thoughts’ reference. But proprioception and introspection have
precisely the same qualification to fix the reference of first-person thoughts—they
too are sources of justification. And if proprioception and introspection fix the
reference of first-person thoughts, that means The Demonstrative Model is correct. It
may be in the end that The Demonstrative Model must be rejected. But if the
justification-maximization principle is correct, there is a prima facie case for it.
Having provided some prima facie motivation for The Demonstrative Model, I
turn to the arguments that have led many theorists of first-person thought to reject it.
2 The Demonstrative Model and the Simple Rule Model
We can use an intuitive contrast between first-person thoughts and visual
demonstrative thoughts as a way of introducing and motivating the dominant
alternative to The Demonstrative Model.
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The intuitive contrast is this. Even in advance of any particular story about how
vision enables us to latch onto objects in thought—e.g. in advance of a story that
appeals to knowledge-maximization or to justification-maximization or to a
principle of acquaintance—we know that this is something vision does. We can
describe cases in which there is really nothing but the fact that a subject can see an
object that could explain how they are latching onto that object in thought—cases in
which the subject has no name to pick out the object, and does not rely on any
description in picking it out. Merely taking as fixed that a particular thought is a
thought of a kind that can be expressed by a demonstrative expression, and that it is
the thought of a particular subject, nothing at all follows about which object the
thought will be about. So there is always an explanatory question about why the
thought has the object that it does, and not some different object. In some cases,
vision—or perhaps some more demanding vision-involving relationship, like the
relationship of visual attention—will be all that one could reasonably appeal to in
answering that question.
Contrast this with the case of first-person thought. Merely taking for granted that
a particular thought can be expressed by the first-person, and that it is a thought of a
particular subject, something does follow about which object the thought is about. It
follows that the thought is about the subject themselves. This is guaranteed by what
seems to be the indisputable fact that any token first-person thought will be about
the person whose token it is, i.e. the person who produces the token. Since this fact
alone determines who a particular first-person thought will be about, there is no
need for, for example, proprioception to do the kind of singling out work that vision
does in the case of visual demonstrative thoughts.
The metaphorical picture we have, in the case of a visual demonstrative, is that of
a first arrow shooting out at an object—this arrow represents vision. The first arrow
is then followed by a second arrow—this arrow represents thought. The second
arrow tracks the first. But, in the first-person case, we already know what trajectory
the arrow representing thought must describe. It must describe a loop. So, the
suggestion is, there is no need to regard the arrow representing thought as tracking
the progress of any first arrow—e.g. one representing proprioception or introspec-
tion. If there happens also to be a first arrow that describes a loop that is interesting.
But we could say what the right trajectory for the second arrow is without reference
to it, or to anything else.
John Campbell has forcefully argued that the fact that any first-person thought
will be about the subject undermines the need for anything like The Demonstrative
Model. He writes:
Only with reluctance should we take this step, which can seem so easy and
indeed inescapable, of supposing that there is a use of the first person on which
its reference is fixed not by the token-reflexive rule [the rule that any token of
the first person will be about the producer of that token] but in some other
way. Many of the most distinctive phenomena involving the first person are
straightforwardly explained by its being governed by the rule. Once we leave
the rule behind, problems swarm upon us. Most immediately and simple is the
question of whether the alternative method of reference-fixing, whatever it is,
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is guaranteed to yield the same results as the token-reflexive rule in what
references it finds for particular uses of the first person. If there is this
guaranteed coincidence, then it is not apparent what advantage there can be in
shifting to the new method. If the coincidence is not guaranteed, then we have
opened up the possibility of someone using the first person to refer to someone
other than himself. But this would not be recognizable as a use of the ordinary
first person. (1994, p. 124)
The token-reflexive rule (or ‘‘simple rule’’, as Campbell also calls it, and as I am
following him in calling it) Campbell explicitly speaks of here applies to the first
person—a particular linguistic device. But it is clear that Campbell thinks that
something analogous holds for first-person thoughts. The analogous rule for first-
person thoughts is the rule that any token first-person thought will be about the
producer of that token. Campbell in fact allows the categories of thought and
language to blur somewhat. But it turns out to be crucial that we not allow these two
categories to blur, if we are properly to evaluate the choice between The
Demonstrative Model and The Simple Rule Model—the model that says that the
reference of first-person thoughts is fixed by the rule that any token first-person
thought will be about the producer of that token.
The claim that the word ‘‘I’’ is governed by the simple rule is fairly plausible
(though it is not uncontroversial). It is fairly plausible that the word ‘‘I’’ is governed
by the simple rule because it is fairly plausible that the word ‘‘I’’ is governed by a
convention whose content is the content of the simple rule. Rules in language just
are conventions.
The exactly parallel suggestion, at the level of thought, would be that first-person
thoughts are governed by the convention that any token first-person thought token
will be about the subject who produces that token. But that just seems wrong.
Thoughts, unlike words, are not typed purely syntactically. Thoughts do not get
their objects in virtue of being governed by conventions. To be a first-person
thought is already to have a certain semantic profile.
It might be replied that the objection assumes an overly robust notion of a rule.
On a less robust understanding, to claim that there is a rule to the effect that any
token first-person thought will be about the subject who produces that token is not to
invoke a convention or anything similar. It is just to claim that the pattern of
reference of first-person thoughts can be correctly described by saying that any
token first-person thought will be about the subject whose thought it is.6
6 Might there be a third option for how to conceive of rules in thought—a conception of them on which
they are robust but on which they are also not to be identified with conventions? A more comprehensive
discussion would take into account the defense of the idea that first person thought is governed by the
Simple Rule—and that thoughts (or, at any rate, concepts) in general are governed by rules—that is
developed in Peacocke (2008). However, it is unclear what conception of rules Peacocke is offering. It
may be that he is treating the notion of a rule as an explanatory primitive. But the question still arises of
why we must accept that thoughts are governed by rules, construed as primitive. It is not just part of
commonsense that they are. Peacocke argues that the claim that first-person thoughts are governed by the
Simple Rule can earn its keep by explaining other first-person phenomena—e.g. the phenomenon of what
he calls ‘‘fully self-conscious uses’’ of the first-person. But, on examination, the detailed explanations of
first-person phenomena Peacocke gives seem to require only that the Simple Rule be true—i.e. that it be
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At this point though, the defender of The Demonstrative Model can turn the
tables on The Simple Rule Model. Campbell’s thought was that, if an alternative
reference-fixing story to The Simple Rule Model is compatible with The Simple Rule
Model, then there is ‘‘no advantage to shifting to the new method’’. But, on the non
robust way of understanding The Simple Rule Model we have been forced to
consider, this becomes far less clear. The point of The Demonstrative Model is to
explain why first-person thoughts have the references that they do. If we agree that it
is correct to say that any token first-person thought will be about the subject who
produces that token, then the task for The Demonstrative Model will be to explain
why it is that any token first-person thought will be about the subject who produces
that token. So, The Demonstrative Model will aim to explain precisely what The
Simple Rule Model takes for granted. If The Demonstrative Model is successful in
this aim it should be preferred to The Simple Rule Model. It should be preferred even
if both models make exactly the same predictions about which things ‘‘particular
uses of the first person’’ refer to.
The task of the next section is to work out whether The Demonstrative Model
really can make the same predictions about which things ‘‘particular uses of the first
person’’ refer to as The Simple Rule Model does. If it cannot, then The
Demonstrative Model will not be acceptable—since it will not even be extensionally
correct. But it is worth pointing out that, even before we have settled that question,
an important conditional conclusion has been established.
The question of how our thoughts engage with things that exist independently of
them has always been regarded as philosophically pressing. It is also an important
constraint on how we conceive of the mental. To take an example of the philosopher
who is closest at hand here, Campbell himself in other work argues that perceptual
consciousness must be what enables perceptual demonstrative thought to engage
with the world, and he argues that the first task for any theory of perceptual
consciousness is to make it intelligible how it can play this role.7 But first-person
thought is equally a kind of thought in which one engages with something—
oneself—that is independent of the thought in which that engagement consists. So,
on the face of it, there seems to be just as pressing a question about how first-person
thought manages to engage with its objects.
It turns out though, once we have distinguished first-person reference in thought
and first-person reference in language, that The Simple Rule Model does not engage
with this question. Properly understood, The Simple Rule Model’s content is
exhausted by the observation that any token first-person thought will be about the
producer of that token. So the model does not address the explanatory question of
why first-person thought has the pattern of reference that it has. It is not obvious
though why shirking that explanatory question should be thought any more
acceptable in the case of first-person thought than it would be in the case of
Footnote 6 continued
the case that any first-person thought will be about the thinker. They do not seem in addition to require
that this be true because there is some robust rule whose content it is that any first-person thought will be
about the thinker.
7 See Campbell (2002).
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perceptual demonstrative thought. So, unless The Demonstrative Model turns out to
be correct—or unless some hitherto unsuspected third option does, which seems
unlikely—there seems to be an embarrassingly central gap in our understanding of
the engagement between mind and world.
This adds urgency to the question of whether The Demonstrative Model can be
defended against the crucial charge that it makes the wrong predictions about which
things certain first-person thoughts refer to.
3 Is the demonstrative model extensionally correct?
Lucy O’Brien pithily sums up what she takes to be the major problem for The
Demonstrative Model as follows:
‘‘I’’ has a special propensity to refer and to stick with its object of reference,
even though the waves of information might seem to want to buffet it this way
and that. (1995, p. 241)
O’Brien’s observation gestures at two kinds of problem case for The Demonstrative
Model which she and Campbell both discuss—cases in which The Demonstrative
Model might appear to make the wrong prediction about which thing a first-person
thought is about.8 The first kind of case is the Anscombe case in which many of
one’s ordinary routes to knowledge of oneself are suspended, because one is inside a
sensory deprivation tank.9 The second kind of case is one in which one is wired up
so that experiences of a sort that are generally caused by the condition of one’s own
body are in fact caused by the condition of someone else’s body—e.g. a case of
‘‘quasi-proprioceptive’’ experience in which I am wired up to someone else’s
knees.10 I will deal with the two kinds of problem case in turn, and, in doing so,
flesh out the version of The Demonstrative Model I think we should accept in a bit
more detail.
3.1 Anscombe’s sensory deprivation tank
Anscombe famously noted the following possibility:
Now imagine that I get into a state of ‘sensory deprivation’. Sight is cut off,
and I am locally anaesthetised everywhere, perhaps floated in a tank of tepid
water; I am unable to speak to or touch any part of my body with any other
(1975, p. 58)
Why might this case seem problematic for a defender of The Demonstrative Model?
Well, in the sensory deprivation tank, one is receiving very little, if any, sensory
8 For Campbell’s discussion, see (1994, pp. 125–126). For O’Brien’s see (2007, pp. 38–47).
9 See Anscombe (1975, p. 56).
10 The notion of quasi-proprioception is modeled on Shoemaker’s notion of quasi-memory. See
Shoemaker (1970).
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information. So, it might seem, one has no basis for knowledge of oneself at all. In
that case, The Demonstrative Model will predict that singling oneself out with a
first-person thought is impossible. But this is the wrong result. One will surely at
least be able to attempt to think a first-person thought in the sensory deprivation
tank. And—unlike in the case of visual demonstrative thoughts—it seems there is a
guarantee that any attempt to think a first-person thought will succeed in netting an
object. Evans denied the existence of this guarantee. He argued that it was based on
an unjustified inference from the observation that any attempt to use the word ‘‘I’’ to
refer was bound to succeed in referring. But following Evans in this denial feels like
a huge cost.11
There is an obvious, but often strangely overlooked, gap in the case that the
sensory deprivation tank case represents even a prima facie problem for The
Demonstrative Model. Granted, in a sensory deprivation tank one is receiving little,
if any, sensory information. But it just does not follow that one has no basis for
knowledge of oneself. After all, much of one’s knowledge of oneself is non-sensory.
I can introspect in a sensory deprivation tank—that is, I can rely on my direct way of
gaining knowledge of my own mental properties. A defender of The Demonstrative
Model who appeals to a knowledge-maximization principle can insist that even
inside the tank first-person thought is possible because introspection is a rich source
for knowledge of oneself that one retains even inside the tank. Similarly, a defender
of The Demonstrative Model who appeals to justification-maximization can insist
that even inside the tank introspection provides one with a source of justified belief
about oneself. A defender of The Demonstrative Model who appeals to an
acquaintance requirement on reference can say that one satisfies the acquaintance
requirement by introspecting one’s mental state.
The appeal to introspection is clearly a helpful expansion of the resources
available to the defender of The Demonstrative Model. It may be wondered though
whether the appeal is licit. Although he never did so explicitly, it is fairly natural to
assume that Evans himself would have said that it is not.12 What is less clear is why
he might have said that, and whether there is any good reason to say it.
Evans’s own version of The Demonstrative Model is motivated by reference to a
highly specific acquaintance requirement according to which thinking about an
object requires one to know which thing one is thinking about. In the case of
material objects, knowing which thing one is thinking about is cashed out in terms
of knowing where that thing is. But, it can surely be pointed out, introspection does
not give one any knowledge of where one is.
This doesn’t seem like a good reason to ignore introspection. First, it will have no
persuasive force for a defender of The Demonstrative Model whose motivation
differs from Evans’s (e.g. because they accept an acquaintance requirement that
does not give a privileged place to knowledge of where one is, or because they
accept a knowledge-maximization or justification-maximization principle rather
11 See (1982, p. 252) for a statement of Evans’s position. See Peacocke (2008, pp. 103–110) for an
argument that no first-person thought can fail to refer.
12 Cassam (1997), who provides a very sophisticated discussion of the sensory deprivation tank case that
is sympathetic to Evans, also never considers appealing to introspection.
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than an acquaintance requirement). Second, the proposed restriction to faculties that
provide knowledge of where one is is so theoretically constricting that even Evans
himself did not adhere to it in actually giving his theory. For example,
kinaesthesia—a faculty that enables one to tell that one is moving—is a faculty
that Evans’s theory appeals to, and it seems a good thing that it does. Likewise, the
faculty by which one tells that the surface of one’s skin is clammy is one that
Evans’s theory appeals to, and it seems a good thing that it does. But neither of these
faculties in any obvious sense provides one with knowledge of where one is.
A more general, perhaps Wittgenstein-inspired worry about the appeal to
introspection is that introspection is, in some pejorative sense, not a genuine faculty.
It is difficult to adjudicate this large issue, and it may be that some resolutions of it
would put pressure on The Demonstrative Model’s appeal to introspection. Even so,
there are reasons not to be overly pessimistic. The full-strength Wittgensteinian case
against introspection is very strong indeed. It implies that what we would ordinarily
think of as introspection based first-person ascriptions of mental states are not even
candidates for knowledge, being mere expressions of the states that they seem to
ascribe. Few now endorse this picture. But it is far from obvious what milder, but
still substantive, claim to associated with the slogan that introspection is not a
genuine faculty. Of some of the most promising candidates—e.g. the claim that it is
wrong to think of introspection as a faculty that is just like vision, except that it is
trained on the mind—it is far from clear why introspection couldn’t be a perfectly
appropriate thing for The Demonstrative Model to appeal to even if it fails to be a
‘‘genuine faculty’’ in the defined sense.
3.2 The quasi-proprioception case
Let us say that that a subject quasi-proprioceives someone else’s body if and only if
the following two conditions are met. (1) The subject has an experience that is
subjectively indistinguishable from a genuine proprioception of their body having a
certain property. (2) They are caused to have this experience by someone else’s
body, not their own, actually having that property.
For example, I might be wired up to someone else’s knees so that when their
knees are actually crossed, this causes me to have an experience that is subjectively
indistinguishable from a genuine proprioception of my knees being crossed.
Everyone should accept that such quasi-proprioceptive experiences are meta-
physically possible. Why might their possibility seem problematic for The
Demonstrative Model? Well, in a case of quasi-proprioception, one’s experience
derives from someone else’s body, not one’s own. But The Demonstrative Model is
supposed to allow experience to play a reference-determining role in first-person
thought. So, it might seem, the waves of quasi-proprioceptive experience should
buffet one’s first-person thought towards the person one is actually gaining
experience from. This could result in one’s first-person thought actually being about
that person. Alternatively, if the other bases on which one makes first-person
judgments are operating normally and buffeting one’s first-person thought in the
direction of oneself, it could result in the failure of the thought to refer to anything at
all. There would then be an analogy with the way a visual demonstrative thought
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can fail to refer because it is anchored on visual information that, unbeknownst to
the subject, derives from two different sources—e.g. two different trees whose
branches have become entangled.
As O’Brien points out, neither of these results seems plausible. For both violate
the constraint that any first-person thought token will be about oneself. So the
defender of The Demonstrative Model had better be able to say something about
why quasi-proprioception experiences do not buffet reference away from the
subject.
The details of what they say will depend on how they motivate their model. To
keep things manageable, I will consider a reply from the point of view of a of
defender of The Demonstrative Model who appeals to knowledge-maximization. It
should be fairly clear that the dialectic would play out similarly for defenders of the
model who appeal to a justification-maximization principle, or to a principle of
acquaintance.
Critic and defender of The Demonstrative Model should both agree that when one
judges ‘‘I have crossed knees’’ because one is quasi-proprioceiving the body of
someone else whose knees really are crossed, that judgment (1) will be about
oneself and (2) will not be knowledge. The critic may insist though out that the
quasi-proprioceptive link does seem to put one in a position to gain knowledge of
the other person. So, if we were simply assigning reference in such a way as to
maximize knowledge, we would assign not oneself, but the other person, as
reference. The Demonstrative Model (as motivated by the knowledge-maximization
principle—I will also leave this implicit in what follows) therefore seems committed
to predicting that the thought will be buffeted towards the other person. A defender
of The Demonstrative Model will naturally attempt to avoid this prediction. But the
critic will be suspicious that this attempt can only succeed if the constraint that any
first-person thought will be about oneself is allowed to trump the unprejudiced
deliverance of The Demonstrative Model.
I think this is a pressing objection, and it makes the quasi-proprioceptive case the
harder of the two problem cases. There are different things a defender of The
Demonstrative Model can say, a more general and a more specific thing.
The more general—and less ambitious—thing to say is that, the existence of
problem cases does not establish that there is anything especially problematic about
the idea that knowledge maximization allows our ways of gaining knowledge of
ourselves to fix the reference of first-person thoughts. For there are analogous
problem cases for the idea that knowledge maximization enables vision to fix the
reference of visual demonstrative thoughts.13,14 Most simply, not all of our visual
demonstrative thoughts are knowledge. If knowledge-maximization is to explain
how vision fixes the reference of these thoughts, some fancy footwork will be
required. If the fancy footwork works out in the visual demonstrative case,
analogous fancy footwork may work in the first-person case. More generally, in
13 For example, Martin (2009) offers examples in which a knowledge-maximization principle seems to
issue the wrong verdict on which object a visual demonstrative thought is about.




relation to almost every kind of reference-determination question, it has proved
difficult to say anything that is at once substantive and plausible. Precisely because
of the difficulty of achieving plausibility, the kind of answers philosophers have
been canvassing in the last decade are notably less substantial than the kind they
pursued in previous decades.15 It isn’t obvious there is any scope for going less
substantial without giving up on reference-determination questions altogether
(arguably, this is what the defender of The Simple Rule Model does, in relation to
first-person thoughts). In that case, the existence of a problem case wouldn’t stop
The Demonstrative Model from being a promising research program.
That answer will be too mealy mouthed for some. A more ambitious approach is
to deny the key premise of the critic’s objection: the premise that quasi-
proprioceptive experiences put one in a position to gain knowledge of the other
person, the person from whom they derive. Without this premise, it does not even
look as though The Demonstrative Model favors an assignment of reference on
which one’s thought is about the other person.
The defender of The Demonstrative Model can point out that all we indisputably
have in the quasi-proprioceptive case is a causal connection between one’s
experience and the other person. But, not every causal connection makes for
knowledge. It can of course be stipulated that the causal connection in question is a
highly reliable one. But, on all but the most extreme reliabilist views, not every
reliable causal connection makes for knowledge either. So it isn’t just obvious that
the quasi-proprioceptive experience puts one in a position to gain knowledge of the
other person.
The defender of The Demonstrative Model can go further and give a positive
argument that quasi-proprioception does not put one in a position to gain knowledge
of the other person. It does not because quasi-proprioceptive experiences do not
present one with the other person.16 How could they while being subjectively
indistinguishable from genuine proprioceptions that present one with oneself?
The critic of The Demonstrative Model may counter-object as follows. Perhaps
quasi-proprioceptive experiences do not present one with the other person. Perhaps
it follows that those experiences do not put one in a position to gain knowledge of
the other person. If both of these are correct, then the original objection about the
case will have been answered. But there is the following modified objection to be
made. The reason that it is so plausible that quasi-proprioceptive experiences do not
present one with the other person is precisely that those experiences do not have that
person as their object. The reason they do not have that person as their object is that
is that they are experiences whose contents are first-person propositions, and any
experience whose content is a first-person proposition will be about oneself. But, if
it is acceptable to simply take for granted that an experience with a first-person
proposition as its content will be about the subject, why is it not acceptable to take
15 I am thinking here, for example, of the programs Fodor and Millikan initiated in the 1970s, which are
highly substantial in that they operate under very thorough-going naturalistic restrictions. Williamson
(2007) explicitly disavows such naturalistic restrictions.
16 The same thing makes it plausible that the experiences do not provide one with justification for belief
about the other person, and that they do not acquaint one with the other person.
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for granted that a thought with a first-person proposition as its content will be about
the subject? How can it be compulsory to address the explanatory question about
thoughts that The Demonstrative Model addresses but permissible to ignore the
exactly parallel explanatory question about experiences?
The defender of The Demonstrative Model can make two replies. The first reply
is that it isn’t obvious that experiences whose natural articulation in thought uses the
first-person (such as quasi-proprioceptive experiences or genuine proprioceptive
experiences) must have first-person propositions as their contents. It may be that
such experiences either lack contents altogether, or have contents other than first-
person propositions. There are are possible explanations of why the person from
whom the quasi-proprioceptive experience derives is not the object of the
experience other than the one suggested by the critic of The Demonstrative Model
in the previous paragraph. For example, there is the following function-based
explanation.
In general, very many things are causally involved in the production of our
experiences, first-person or otherwise. Not all of these things are the objects of our
experiences. Very plausibly, facts about what functions our sensory faculties have
are relevant to settling which among the things that are causally implicated in the
production of our experiences are the objects of those experiences. For example, a
particular distal object I am looking at, rather than any of the countless causal
intermediaries between the object and my experience, may be the object of my
visual experience in part because the function of vision is to provide awareness of
distal objects.
Similarly, it is highly plausible that the function for which proprioception has
evolved is to provide us with awareness of our own bodies (here, it becomes
relevant that there were no instances of quasi-proprioception in the circumstances of
our actual evolution).17 So, quasi-proprioceptive experiences causally derive from
something other than the thing of which the faculty they are exercises of has the
function of providing awareness. That is a possible explanation of why they do not
present one with, or put one in position to gain knowledge of, the person from whom
they causally derive that does not presuppose that they have first-person
propositions as their contents.
The second reply to the modified objection the defender of The Demonstrative
Model can make is compatible with the view that quasi-proprioceptive experiences
have first-person propositions as their contents. It says that, even with that being the
case, The Demonstrative Model can still have explanatory value. A way of seeing
this is to imagine that we have been persuaded that the contents of visual
experiences are visual demonstrative propositions, and are therefore identical to the
contents of visual demonstrative judgments.18 Even if we have been have persuaded
of this, and even if we do not have a glimmer of a story about how visual
experiences themselves get their contents, it still seems true to say of a particular
17 See Martin (1997) for a defense of this view.
18 This is not a view of the contents of visual experience that Campbell accept. See Campbell (2002).




visual demonstrative thought—e.g. a thought I would express by uttering the
sentence ‘‘That bottle is small’’—that it is about the bottle it is about because that
bottle is the one I can see. For example, this seems truer than saying that it is about
that bottle because that bottle is the bottle is I can hear, or because it is the bottle
you can see, or because it is the bottle that was an especial favorite of its maker.
And, more generally, it still seems right to recognize a non-empty category of visual
demonstrative thoughts—a category of thoughts that have the reference they do
because of what the subject is looking at. Similarly, the Demonstrative Model says
that one’s first-person thoughts are about oneself because their reference is fixed by
first-person experiences. This can be true even if we have no worked out story about
how first-person experiences themselves get their contents.
The quasi-proprioception case is a difficult case for a defender of The
Demonstrative Model. Different defenders of the model will say different things
about it, depending on how they have motivated their model—e.g. by reference to a
knowledge-maximization principle, or to a justification-maximization principle or
to a principle of acquaintance. Even just focusing on one of these motivations—e.g.
knowledge-maximization—there are different points at which the objection can be
tackled. A defender of the Demonstrative Model just needs one of these defenses to
work.
4 Conclusion
What determines the reference of first-person thoughts? The answer The Simple
Rule Model gives to this question initially appears both crystal clear and extremely
plausible. Things get murkier once we clarify that the question is a question about
thought, not language, and we pause to ask what notion of rule governing thoughts
the model invokes. So far, we have not seen a version of The Simple Rule Model that
is both plausible and explanatory. Dialectically, that gives The Demonstrative
Model its opening.
The outstanding objection to The Demonstrative Model is that certain problem
cases show that it is not extensionally adequate. Finding the right way to deal with
these problem cases is tricky enough to make it tempting to indulge in a revisionary
view about what the pattern of reference of first-person thoughts is. This, in my
view, is what Evans did (although he denied that what he was doing was
revisionary). But we should resist the temptation—the pattern of reference of first-
person thoughts is a surer thing than any philosophical theory that seeks to explain
it.
Showing that The Demonstrative Model is extensionally adequate, even in the
problem cases, is a non trivial task. Part of the difficulty is generic: The
Demonstrative Model attempts to answer a reference-determination question, and
saying something substantial and plausible about reference-determination questions
tends to be difficult. Still, it is more convincing if we can say something specific to
fend off the charge of extensional inadequacy. Doing so encourages us to make a
few somewhat surprising argumentative moves. For example, it encourages us to
give an explanatory role to introspection. It encourages us to take a particular view
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about the nature of quasi-proprioception. The main pay off for making these moves
is that it puts us in a position to give an explanation of the pattern of reference of
first-person thought that does not involve being revisionary about what that pattern
of reference is.
Another, closely related, pay-off is that we are in a position to reject what I think
of as ‘first-person exceptionalism’, the idea that there is something highly
exceptional about first-person thought. The idea runs through Campbell’s rich
seam of work on the topic.19 According to Campbell, what is exceptional about first-
person thoughts is that their conceptual role and their pattern of reference are only
rather loosely connected. Visual demonstrative thoughts are the main foil he uses to
bring this out. The conceptual role of visual demonstrative thoughts involves
evidential sensitivity to certain experiences—visual experiences—and those very
experiences also play a role in fixing visual demonstrative thoughts’ reference. By
contrast, the conceptual role of first-person thoughts involves evidential sensitivity
to certain experiences—experiences whose natural articulation in thought uses the
first-person—but those same experiences, on Campbell’s view, play no role in fixing
first-person thoughts’ reference. This observation about first-person thoughts even
leads Campbell to express qualified sympathy for Anscombe’s—arch first-person
exceptionalist—idea that first-person thoughts do not refer. What is right about
Anscombe’s idea, in Campbell’s view, is that the ascription of reference to first-
person thoughts does no explanatory work.
If this is right, then one urgently needs to answer the question of why it is that,
uniquely, in the case of first-person, the ascription of reference does no explanatory
work. Much of Campbell’s recent positive work on first-person thought is motivated
precisely as an attempt to answer this question. If one thinks that reference just is an
explanatory notion, one is likely to be pessimistic about these attempts. But if The
Demonstrative Model is correct, the puzzle that makes them necessary is dissolved.
On The Demonstrative Model, first-person experiences do fix the reference of first-
person thoughts.
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